Security
What Keyvalv protects against, what it cannot, and what it writes.
What Keyvalv protects against
- A break-in at our servers. No server of ours holds your vault or keys, so a break-in there takes neither (a hijacked update is another matter, below).
- A break-in at your cloud storage. Your vault is encrypted on your computer before your sync app uploads it (a vault Keyvalv makes uses KDBX 4 with Argon2id at 64 MiB and ChaCha20), so someone who gets into your cloud account gets a file they cannot read without your master password or emergency sheet.
- A lookalike site. Logins are offered only on the site they were saved for, so a phishing page gets nothing.
- A computer you did not approve. Your computers that have opened your vault before accept a new one only with a one-time code shown on one of them, or your emergency sheet, so getting into your synced folder is not enough to add one.
- A damaged file or an old copy. On a computer that has opened your vault before, Keyvalv keeps the last good copy, so if a sync app cuts the file short or hands back an old copy, it tells you and puts that copy back when you ask.
- A lost or stolen laptop. The vault locks after the time you choose, when the browser closes and when the computer locks (on by default), and then opens only with your master password, or, if you turned on Touch ID or Windows Hello, your computer's own unlock.
What it catches, and what it cannot
A KeePass file already refuses to open if someone without your master password changes it. What it cannot see is a whole, valid copy that is older than yours, or an edit by someone who has your password. So Keyvalv keeps a signed history inside the file, in KDBX custom data that KeePassXC keeps: each of your computers has its own Ed25519 key and signs every change it makes, each record carries the SHA-256 of the one before, and each computer remembers the newest record it accepted.
- Refused, with your last good copy kept, on a computer that has opened your vault before: a copy older than the newest record it accepted (a restored backup, or a sync conflict that went the wrong way), a forged or removed history, and a change from a device you never approved.
- Listed for you to accept: a change made outside your Keyvalv computers, in another KeePass app such as KeePassXC or by anyone else with your password. It is listed item by item, without values, and Keyvalv saves nothing more until you accept it. Meanwhile it fills from the file as it now is.
- Not caught: on a computer that has never opened your vault, or whose browser data was cleared, Keyvalv has nothing to compare with, so it accepts an old copy, or a vault that someone with your master password made in its place. Nor is anything checked in a file made in another app until you choose Protect.
- Not prevented: the file being deleted; Keyvalv says it is gone, and your browser keeps the last five versions to put back.
What Keyvalv writes into your file
- Nothing, until you choose Protect. Before that first write, Keyvalv offers the file as it is now to download.
- Then its own data, under keys that start with
keyvalv., goes into the file's KDBX custom data, the place the format keeps for other apps' data; which phone apps keep it is checked before launch. - The emergency sheet's locked copy of your master password goes into the header's public custom data, protected by the sheet's 128-bit code through Argon2id, so your file alone gives nobody your password.
- A file in the older KDBX 3.1 format becomes KDBX 4 with Argon2id only if you agree, since KeePass 2.47 and older cannot open that.
- Keyvalv's tests open every kind of file it writes with KeePassXC's own command-line tool, so KeePassXC keeps opening yours.
What it does not protect against
- A computer that is already compromised. Malware that can read your screen or your keyboard can read your passwords too, whatever manager you use.
- A weak master password. Everything rests on it, and Keyvalv only insists on 8 characters, so make it a long phrase nobody would guess.
- Someone with your file and your master password or emergency sheet. Either opens your vault, and the sheet can let a new computer in if you lose all of yours, so keep it somewhere safe.
- Someone who knows your computer's password or PIN, if you turned on Touch ID or Windows Hello. It opens Keyvalv on that computer too, so turn this on only where nobody else knows it; the file itself still needs your master password or sheet.
- The vault while it is unlocked. It is open in your browser's memory until it locks, so whatever controls your browser can reach it. Locking drops it; the browser may keep traces in memory until it reuses that memory.
- A hijacked update. Chrome installs extension updates without asking, so if our Chrome Web Store account or build were taken over, a bad update could read your vault, and your master password the next time you type it, as it could with any extension.
- A computer that has never opened your vault, or whose browser data was cleared. It has nothing to compare with, so it accepts an old copy, or a vault someone with your master password made in its place.
- What your cloud sees. It cannot read your passwords, but it sees the file's size, when it changes, and two times in its header: when your emergency sheet was made and when your master password last changed.
What the extension can see
Chrome warns that Keyvalv can read and change data on all websites, because it has to find sign-in fields wherever you sign in. Nothing from a page leaves your computer: the extension makes no network requests.
Check it yourself
- The manifest asks for no host permissions, and the extension's own pages and background run under
connect-src 'none', so they cannot open a connection to any server. The scripts it adds to web pages make no requests either, which its readable code shows. - The extension is not open source, but every installed copy carries its own code unminified, so anyone can check what it does; only the Argon2 key derivation is a published library's compiled WebAssembly.
Report a vulnerability
Until launch, write to hello@keyvalv.com (also in security.txt). We aim to reply within a few working days, fix confirmed issues first, and credit you if you wish. Please give us reasonable time to fix a problem before publishing it. Before launch, security@keyvalv.com will take these reports.
Before launch
Before launch we will publish a plain-language and a technical write-up of the design, so anyone can check these claims. Keyvalv is built with an AI coding assistant, which is why an independent audit comes before launch; this page will say when it is done.
Back to keyvalv.com